Worth noting that the arrests happened in 2022 just a month after the outbreak of war. The article writers are anti-CPRF Trots, so read the article particularly critically. It’s important to know that in the last few years support for the soviet system has risen quite dramatically in Russia, and right now United Russia’s growing opposition is the CPRF, not any Trot org. The crackdown shown here on Marxists is part of the careful balancing act the nationalist bourgeoisie are trying to maintain and twist soviet pride and support into Russian nationalism. It’s certainly a dynamic time in Russia.

It’s absolutely worth reading the CPRF’s analysis on the arrests:

The Altai Regional Branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) views the criminal prosecution of Svetlana Kerber, an assistant to Lyudmila Klyushnikova, a Communist Party member in the regional legislative assembly, as political pressure on the deputy due to her “opposition activities and active advocacy for the interests of city residents.” The regional branch published this statement on its Telegram channel on November 18.

On November 15, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Barnaul sentenced Kerber to two months’ pretrial detention. Prior to this, law enforcement officers had searched her home and charged her with fraud. They alleged that she had fictitiously secured employment with the regional parliament without actually performing any work. “Svetlana Kerber was officially employed as Lyudmila Klyushnikova’s assistant and legally received her salary. Lyudmila Klyushnikova never had any complaints about her work,” the Altai communists insist.

The court ordered the woman and the mother of a minor child to be held in pretrial detention for failing to fulfill her duties as a deputy’s assistant. No one consulted the deputy himself—Klyushnikova wasn’t even allowed into the session, complained Maria Prusakova, a State Duma deputy from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation who represents the Altai Krai region. “The same kind of activity is being carried out against our other deputies. We will fight this, because now [law enforcement] is trying to create a precedent that will be used as a template for any undesirable deputy,” she told Vedomosti.

Prusakova is confident that such actions against the Communists will continue, especially in the lead-up to the 2026 Duma campaign. “This is essentially the start of the election campaign. But I can say that for residents of the Altai Krai, it’s absolutely clear and understandable that such actions will further boost support [for the Communists],” she emphasized.

The day before, on November 14, Artavazd Oganesyan, a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation faction in the Primorsky Krai Legislative Assembly, was arrested for two months. He is accused of attempting to sell 50 kg of mercury, a toxic substance, for $350,000 (Part 3 of Article 234 of the Russian Criminal Code – illegal sale of toxic substances by an organized group), according to the Primorsky Krai Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecutor’s office did not provide the full name of the suspect in the case, but the publication was accompanied by a video showing the deputy walking under guard. This charge carries a prison sentence of up to eight years. Local media reports indicate that Oganesyan is one of the sponsors of the regional branch.

Sergei Obukhov, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) Central Committee’s Secretary for Elections, also told Vedomosti that such arrests are a form of administrative pressure on the CPRF. “The party in Vladivostok organized high-profile rallies against the recycling fee. And in the Altai Territory, the communists hold various protests almost every week. A coincidence, so to speak? I don’t think so,” he said.

Where the Communists have strong regional branches, party members tend to have difficult relationships with local authorities: this applies to the Altai and Perm Krais, the Lipetsk Region, and the Komi Republic, says political scientist Alexander Kynev. The goal of such “pressure” is to demoralize regional activists, he explains. Meanwhile, Kynev points out, voter support isn’t declining; on the contrary, the electorate is sympathetic to such persecution. He adds that it’s not a given that arrests will intensify just before the State Duma elections, as they typically try to “resolve” issues related to ineligibility for elections during the run-up to the elections; during the campaign itself, such actions appear “unnecessary,” he adds.

In Primorye, according to political scientist Konstantin Kalachev, authorities still can’t forget the 2018 gubernatorial election, when Communist Party candidate Andrei Ishchenko nearly won. “And although many years have passed, the trauma clearly remains,” he told Vedomosti.

The election then proceeded to two rounds, the last of which was declared invalid. Acting Governor Andrei Tarasenko (United Russia) received 49.55% of the vote in the second round, while Ishchenko received 48.06%, despite the Communist Party leader leading until the very end. Ella Pamfilova, head of the Central Election Commission, admitted that the results had been falsified at some polling stations. During the rerun, it was not Tarasenko who took part, but Oleg Kozhemyako (United Russia), the acting governor appointed by the president, who had transferred from his post as head of the Sakhalin Region. Ishchenko also dropped out of the race, having been disqualified from registration due to a municipal filter. As a result, the United Russia candidate received 61.88%.

Furthermore, in 2024, the Primorsky Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation expelled 16 people from the party at once, Kalachev recalled. These communists accused regional functionaries of attempting to turn the local branch into a “party of compromisers.” “Perhaps the struggle for the regional branch continues. Are Oganesyan’s problems, considered a party sponsor, related to this? Perhaps there’s no direct connection, but he’s not the first member of the regional branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to be investigated,” the expert concluded.

As for the Altai Krai, the communists there have a “very militant organization,” although there is also a “purely regional conflict.” At the federal level, by contrast, it seems the CPRF has received “favored treatment,” Kalachev added. However, one can expect more situations in which local CPRF branches will face pressure ahead of the Duma campaign, the political scientist suggested.

“I certainly wouldn’t talk about systemic pressure across the country. Such arrests could actually backfire and strengthen the party’s position, bolstering its image as the sole opposition,” says political scientist Dmitry Elovsky. With the right media promotion from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, such criminal cases could well boost the party’s ratings ahead of the State Duma elections, since the protest-minded electorate hasn’t gone away, he notes.

In short, because of the rising communist movement among the populace, crackdowns on communists are largely regional and at a smaller scale than in the west, while the nationalist bourgeoisie tries to coopt the movement and make it about Russian nationalism.